Pat Burrell Designated For Assignment
Like life, mistakes in baseball are unavoidable. It’s not always about avoiding mistakes – okay, it is largely about avoiding obvious mistakes – as much as responding and evolving from mistakes made. The focus is going to be on whether the Pat Burrell signing was a mistake. Or perhaps categorizing just how big of a mistake it was, and well, that’s fine. Ostensibly the move is a mistake looking back, but at the time, it was unreasonable to expect a .672 OPS. That figure now represents Burrell’s legacy with the Rays, along with the $16 million the Rays paid him.
Fresh from winning the American League, the Rays allowed Eric Hinske and Cliff Floyd to reach free agency while non-tendering Jonny Gomes. Clearly they would pursue a designated hitter, and clearly it would be one of the top few designated hitters on the market. Milton Bradley was out there, Jason Giambi and Bobby Abreu from the hated Yankees too. And, yes, Burrell. The same Burrell who, just months beforehand, had turned a J.P. Howell pitch into a double and cemented the Phillies’ World Series victory.
The Rays offered Abreu more money than he would eventually sign for. Giambi seemingly had his heart set on an Oakland reunion. And Bradley, well, who knows what Bradley was thinking when he signed with the Chicago Cubs who had the ever mercurial Lou Piniella as manager and played without a designated hitter. Adam Dunn refused to become a DH too. That left Burrell as the guy not only willing to sign, but best suited for the job.
What went wrong? Who knows. Burrell’s bat may have slowed due to natural decay or because of poor conditioning. There was the neck injury that occurred before Burrell even had a chance to settle in. And yeah, there will be other speculation about what put the bat in Pat the Bat, but the entire story just seems odd. Burrell was once the number one selection in the amateur draft. He played college ball at the University of Miami – as a third baseman, of all things – and he hit 251 home runs for the Phillies. He got on base nearly 37% of the time for the Phillies. He had an .852 OPS for the Phillies. None of that translated.
Shortly before the 2009 season started Andrew Friedman was on a local radio show and said something to the effect of, “You can pencil Burrell in for his 30 home runs right now.” Burrell would hit 16 in a little over 140 games with the Rays. But there was reason to believe he would hit 30 home runs. He had hit at least 25 in every season since 2005 and clearly the Rays didn’t foresee him collapsing as a 32- or 33-year-old.
That’s not to say there wasn’t expected decline. Burrell walked, struck out, and homered a lot. He held negative value on the basepaths and defense except when it came to the realm of unintentional comedy. Those players simply do not age well, but Burrell’s decline has been more radical than even the most pessimistic of projections. This wasn’t quite a Greg Vaughn situation – a similar player a few years older coming from an extreme hitter’s park. The consensus on the Burrell deal was positive.
Maybe the world title weakened Burrell’s sense of drive. Maybe he felt like he’d accomplished everything. Maybe he just became bored with the mundane nature that comes with playing 162-plus games a year and doing so while only hitting once every few innings. Maybe the neck hurt him more than we’ll ever know, or maybe he figured no fielding responsibilities meant his conditioning could slide. Maybe a mixture.
The only comforting thoughts from the Burrell era are that 1) none of the other options, minus Abreu, have turned out to be bargains or excessively superior and 2) Burrell only cost the Rays money, not draft picks, not minor league talent, just money. Obviously the money could be better spent elsewhere, although it’s impossible to say where it would have went. Maybe a Cliff Lee or Victor Martinez deal gets done. Or maybe a Scott Kazmir deal doesn’t happen. What’s more important than what may have happened is what will happen. Knowing the front office, this is what it is. A potential learning experience.
Theo Epstein has his Julio Lugo, Billy Beane his Esteban Loaiza, Brian Cashman his Jaret Wright, and I guess Andrew Friedman his Pat Burrell.
Games Thirty-Two Through Thirty-Four
Gabe Kapler’s robbed home run is the enduring image from Mark Buehrle’s perfect game. That kind of trademark defensive play is largely absent from Dallas Braden’s, unless one wants to count Kevin Kouzmanoff or perhaps Eric Patteron’s snag in the ninth. Overall though, there were no tough looking outs, which suggests that the final out made in the game might be the lasting image. That final out was just so happen to be made by, whom else, Gabe Kapler.
The remarkable thing about Kapler making the significant outs in two perfect games is not that it might be his long-term career highlight, but instead that he’s even in the major leagues. The Detroit Tigers selected him in the 57th round of the 1995 draft. Pick number 1,488. There have been 13 players selected at that pick:
2009 Chris Constantino (3B, Boston)
2008 Levi Rosencrans (C, Texas)
2006 Baron Frost (OF, Toronto)
2005 Cameron Satterwhite (OF, Cleveland)
2004 Bryan Wagner (RHP Chicago A)
1997 Aaron Heilman (RHP, New York A)
1996 Harris Stanton (OF, Chicago N)
1995 Gabe Kapler (3B, Detroit)
1994 Bill Eaton (SS, Milwaukee)
1993 Michael Hannah (OF, Toronto)
1991 Jason Rogers (LHP, Texas)
1990 Cedric Moore (OF, Houston)
1989 Mario Prats (LHP, Houston)
Heilman, of course, is the only player of that bunch to make the majors. Heilman’s had a nice career in his own right, but Kapler is clearly the cream of Club 1448’s crop. Kapler could have played his college ball at Cal State Fullerton, but instead transferred to Moorpark College (located in Moorpark, California). Believe it or not, Kapler is one of 43 draft picks out of the college and one of four players to make it to the show. The next most notable Moorpark College alumni might be Tyler Johnson – formerly a left-handed specialist with the St. Louis Cardinals.
Kapler managed to tear through the minors. In his first full minor league season, he hit 26 home runs for the Tigers’ A-Level affiliate. He moved up a level, and repeated the process, blasting 65 extra base hits, including 40 doubles. Kapler would again receive a promotion to begin the 1998 season, and again would go nuts on the competition. This time he hit .322/.393/.583 with 28 home runs, 47 doubles, and a record-setting 146 runs batted in. Such performances were hard to ignore and lead to Baseball America naming him as the 34th best prospect in the land prior to the 1999 season.
1999 saw Kapler playing in 130 games for the Tigers, hitting .245/.315/.447 with 18 home runs. During the off-season, the Tigers would trade him and a slew of others (including Frank Catalanotto and Francisco Cordero) to the Rangers for Juan Gonzalez, Danny Patterson, and Gregg Zaun. Kapler would be one other time during his career, that coming in 2002 when the Rangers sent him and Jason Romano to the Colorado Rockies for Todd Hollandsworth and Dennys Reyes.
In short time, Kapler would latch on with the Boston Red Sox as a defensive substitute and left-handed pitching masher. He would win a World Series with the club in 2004 and suffer through some injuries in 2005 and 2006 before heading to Japan. All and all, his career slash stats stood at .270/.331/.418 with 64 home runs and 68 stolen bases. Kapler would eventually return and re-enter the Boston organization as a manager. His team didn’t play so well, and Kapler became frustrated with the inane issues that younger players deal with. He would return to playing in 2008, and the rest is recent history.
A man of Jewish faith, Kapler has tattoos that symbolize his people’s struggles and triumphs. Perhaps ironically, since his religion bemoans tattoos. A man with an expansive vocabulary, a clear understanding of the game, and a playing style that mimics that of smaller and less physically gifted middle infielders. Perhaps ironically, since Kapler’s passion is bodybuilding. During that 1999 season, the Tigers wore throwback jerseys with numbers honoring the greats to play in Tiger Stadium. Kapler wore Ty Cobb’s number, or rather, didn’t wear a number at all. Perhaps ironically, since Cobb was a well-documented anti-Semite who would probably not play alongside Kapler and would never consider befriending Kapler.
Being the lasting image of two perfect games isn’t exactly ironic, but rather iconic.
Games Twenty-Nine Through Thirty-One
Just … just read these:
Games Twenty-Six Through Twenty-Eight (The Resting Players Post)
The Rays are on the west coast for the foreseeable future. I am not. That makes viewing the games in their entirety rough and that makes writing about the games even more difficult. Instead of trying, I’ll just try to produce something like this for each series. Hopefully it works.
One of the chief criticisms around Joe Maddon has been his insistence on resting players early and often during a season. There’s a stigma concerning sitting out games throughout sports, particularly professional sports. Cal Ripken Jr. was a great ballplayer, but he’s best known for his bullheadedness in playing through whatever aches and pains are acquired throughout a six month season in favor of sitting out once for years at a time. This is probably unfair to Ripken’s talents – I mean, a lesser player would never have the power to avoid sitting out, for one – but I think he actually hurt a cause for players.
Erik Bedard is the poster child for ‘frail’ athletes. He doesn’t like to pitch beyond 100 pitches – a mark that he feels is his limit – and he doesn’t like to pitch when he’s hurt. And he’s hurt often. For some reason, players who say, “Hey, enough’s enough, I just can’t give it my all out there because of this injury …” are labeled as weak or inferior. I’m not entirely sure why. By sitting out when he’s not 100% or anywhere near it, Bedard is probably helping his team, not hurting it by A) pitching at a below comfortable level of health and B) not risking further injury.
I don’t know whether the players are open and honest with Maddon about not feeling well physically. I hope they are because that would speak volumes about the strong relationships Maddon has been able to forge with these players in a brief period of time. Players are so tuned in to going every day that it’s a badge of honor to be honest and not to be selfish in continuing to play at sub-optimal levels just because that’s the manly thing to do.
The problem extends off the field and outside of the clubhouse too. Some fans and media members may question the player’s toughness and desire. To those, I would offer the story of J.R. Richard. The Houston Astros made Richard the second overall pick in the 1969 MLB draft behind only Jeff Burroughs (the father of former Rays’ third baseman Sean Burroughs). Richard was an imposing figure on the mound. He stood six-foot-eight and whipped a heater so fast that it would break the triple digits barrier with supposed ease.
Beginning in 1975, Richard would rack up five consecutive seasons where he threw at least 200 innings. He would strike out 1,220 in 1,328 innings and possess a 1.93 strikeout-to-walk ratio. Richard actually threw more complete games during that stretch (69) than he allowed home runs (65). He was dominant in every sense of the word. Richard was paired with another flamethrower by the name of Nolan Ryan, causing the National League night terrors previously unforeseen until the release of Jaws.
Richard looked and behaved like a horse. He ate innings for breakfast, lunch, and dinner, and he enjoyed them with anything, everything, or nothing added. Then, sometime in 1980, he began to complain about a sore throwing arm. Despite his track record of durability, not everyone believed Richard’s complaints to be sincere. In a July start Richard would reportedly experience issues seeing the catcher’s signs and had issues throwing pitches. The Astros would remove him from the game, and he would be placed on the disabled list, but the Astros would fail to send him to the hospital or have him undergo medical tests of any sort.
Weeks later, Richard would suffer a stroke. Collapsing during outfield toss and leading to life saving surgery within hours. He would never pitch in a regular season game again.
Richard was ignored despite being honest and forthright. What Ripken accomplished is amazing, no doubt, but he taught a generation of players that playing through aches and pains is not only part of the game, but a part of the game that is treated with respect and reverence. I don’t know if players of today are any more afraid to speak up about injuries than they were 20-, 30-, or 100-years ago, but if they are, I wouldn’t be shocked if some of that is residual from the coverage of Ripken.
I would imagine the Rays have done research on resting patterns. That does not mean they hold the answers or know the secret formula to keep Carl Crawford running fresh through October. Though, it doesn’t mean they don’t either. There’s a lot of stake for these players in money and reputation. They’d play through broken bones, muscle pulls, and probably ligament tears if they could. Maddon can’t make his players tell him the truth about when they can’t go, so instead he goes about it like this. In the end, his job is to put the players in the best position to succeed and win games.
Even if every so often the best position for the superstars is on the bench.
Game Twenty-Five
You may never see an easier-to-manage 1-0 victory than today’s game. The only bullpen decisions to be made were obvious ones (Choate versus the lefties, Wheeler versus the righty, Soriano in the ninth) and there was no pinch hitting or running. Pretty efficient game overall.
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The Rays are now 18-7, which is a 72% win rate. That’s four wins in the bank no matter what you have them projected at. They will not continue to win 72% of their games, but that doesn’t mean you should expect them to start losing games to even out to a 56% win rate either. Anyone claiming a split of the Royals series is ‘regression’ doesn’t know what they’re talking about and is falling into the gambler’s fallacy.
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About a month in, and there’s nothing to complain about. This team is doing better than expected without its best reliever, without its starting right fielder, and without its best catcher. That’s impressive.
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As an aside: I don’t get the feeling I would enjoy writing about Trey Hillman.
Game Twenty-Four
Didn’t see the game and don’t particularly care to relieve what appears to be a disappointing affair.
Game Twenty-Three
This match-up would not have been the one I predicted would become a pitcher’s duel. Here are the career numbers of the two starters entering Friday night:
Brian Bannister 563.2 IP, 4.88 xFIP, 41.6% GB, 1.76 K/BB, 6.2% SwStr
Jeff Niemann 218.2 IP, 4.59 xfIP, 40.4% GB, 2.14 K/BB, 7.0% SwStr
Instead of a slugfest, we had two runs scored through eight innings. Neither pitched remarkably well, mind you, but it would seem Bannister had the edge on the night. 13 of the 19 balls in play against him were of the groundball variety, he struck out three (walking two) and only one ball in play actually turned into a hit against him. Niemann walked more than he struck out (although that number is skewed by an intentional walk) and 9 of the 17 balls in play were grounders.
The runs column is nicer the pair than it could be.
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Randy Choate started the night against a lefty and wound up giving up a hit. People are going to question this, but frankly the difference between Rafael Soriano and Choate against one batter – especially a lefty – is so marginal that it’s not even worth the discussion. Not a big deal here, wouldn’t be a big deal if Soriano gets out of the inning unscathed or if Evan Longoria’s fly ball goes a few feet further.
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